总量–交易机制下竞争性供应链间减排策略

    Carbon Emission Reduction for Competitive Supply Chains under the Cap-and-Trading Scheme

    • 摘要: 在碳排放总量–交易机制下,为了研究两个初始碳排放存在差异的竞争性供应链减排问题,借助动态博弈论,构建了双方的Stackelberg博弈模型,并利用逆向归纳法解析得到了供应链间交互影响的定价和减排策略。考虑到系统均衡在形式上的复杂性,基于三维数值仿真技术,在Matlab中模拟了关键参数对系统绩效指标的影响。给出了两个供应链减排和定价策略与系统关键参数之间的量化变化关系。研究发现,过高的碳技术投资成本不利于市场竞争性减排;趋同性高度竞争市场不利于减排;碳技术投资成本和低碳意识的同步改善能最大化消费者剩余。

       

      Abstract: Under the Cap-and-Trading scheme, aiming at carbon emission reduction for two competitive supply chains with different original carbon emission, a Stackelberg model is constituted based on dynamic game theory. The backward induction analysis method is applied to get the pricing and carbon emission reduction strategies. Due to the complexity in their form, the 3-dimensional numerical simulation technique is used to simulate the impact of key parameters to system performance indexes. Quantitative relations among carbon emission, pricing strategies and key parameters are finally obtained. Results show that much high emission reduction investment can not benefit their carbon emission, but product differentiation can play its role, and improvement in low carbon technology investment and environmental consciousness meanwhile will tend to maximize consumer surplus.

       

    /

    返回文章
    返回