Abstract: In order to overcome the interfacial microstructure contradiction caused by participation and interests discrepancy in the public cultural facilities construction and management and improve public cultural projects, a replicated dynamic method in evolutionary game theory is used to research the game relationship among the owner, the contractor and the public in public cultural facilities construction of our country. By building an asymmetric tripartite game payoff matrix and analyzing replication dynamic equation, stable strategies under different conditions are derived. And three dimensional stereograms are given to show the influence that the variation of different parameters have on the strategic evolutionary trend and stability. Results show that punishment strength on speculation, supervision cost and positive social incentive from the public affect the owner′s strategic choice; that anticipated punishment on speculation, and the public evaluation′s influence on the income affect the contractor′s strategic choice; and that whether the public cultural facilities supply meets the demand of the public affects the public′s strategic choice. In the end, strategic evolutionary trend stereograms under different conditions of three parties are combined to discuss the whole system′s game equilibrium states and find four groups of evolutionary stable strategies under different initial states of parameters.