A Research on Optimal Decision Making of Remanufacturing Closed-loop Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidies and Different Recycling Channels

In order to study the influence of different recycling channels on the decision-making of the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under the government's implementation of remanufacturing subsidies and recycling subsidies, a Stackelberg master-slave game model in a closed-loop supply chain with manufacturers as leaders and retailers and recyclers as followers is established to compare and analyze the optimal pricing and recycling strategies of different recycling channels under two subsidy methods. The results show that the amount of subsidy can reduce product prices and wholesale prices, stimulate consumption, increase recycling rates, and increase the profits of all participants in the closed-loop supply chain, regardless of the type of subsidy. When there are dual recycling channels, the intensity of competition between recyclers and retailer for recycling affects product prices, recycling rates, and manufacturers' profits, while recycling transfer prices are only related to the types of subsidies. Finally, the impact of different subsidies and different recycling channels on the closed-loop supply chain is discussed through a case analysis.