Targeted Subsidy Strategy of Ride-hailing Platform with Heterogeneous Subsidy-sensitive Passengers

According to the actual background of subsidizing passengers by issuing coupons, the subsidy strategy selection of ride-hailing platform is studied. Passengers are divided into two categories according to their sensitivity to the amount of subsidy: the highly sensitive group of subsidies and the low-sensitive group of subsidies. On the basis of constructing the game models of non-subsidy and unified subsidy, the strategy of targeted subsidy is studied, and the optimal decision of the platform is obtained by backward induction. The platform decision and optimal profit of the three strategies are compared and analyzed by numerical examples. The results show that the subsidy amount of the platform is positively correlated with the commission rate. The platform may obtain the maximum profit under the three strategies. The sensitivity of subsidizing highly sensitive passengers determines whether to subsidize passengers, and the selection of subsidy strategy should comprehensively consider the proportion and the subsidy sensitivity coefficient of subsidizing highly sensitive groups. In addition, the impact of different strategies of the platform on social welfare is deeply discussed, and the reference and suggestions are provided for the platform to formulate subsidy strategies.