工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2014, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (3): 46-50.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑零售商过度自信的供应链决策与协调

  

  1. 南京工业大学 经济与管理学院, 江苏 南京 210009
  • 出版日期:2014-06-30 发布日期:2014-07-14
  • 作者简介:石岿然（1971-），男，湖南省人，教授，博士，主要研究方向为供应链管理、演化经济学、博奕论与产业组织论.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目（71071075，71173103）；国家社会科学基金重大项目（12&ZD204）

Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination Considering Overconfident Behavior of the Retailer

  1. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Technology, Nanjing 210009, China
  • Online:2014-06-30 Published:2014-07-14

摘要： 将过度自信引入到供应链中，通过构建由一个供应商和一个过度自信的零售商组成的二级供应链模型，分析了过度自信的零售商与供应商的决策。结果表明,零售商过度自信能够实现供应链协调，但供应商的回购契约会破坏这种协调；当零售商接收到市场不利信息时供应商的回购契约失效，当零售商接收到市场有利信息时供应商利润随过度自信程度增加而减少。进一步在模型中引入收益共享契约，使得订购量和供应商的利润均增加，并实现了供应链协调。最后，通过数值算例验证并阐明了相关结论。

关键词: 供应链协调, 过度自信, 回购契约

Abstract: By incorporating overconfidence into the model, a twoechelon supply chain composed of one supplier and one overconfident retailer is investigated and their decisionmaking is analyzed. It is shown that if the retailer is overconfident, the supply chain can achieve coordination. However, supply chain coordination may be destroyed under the buyback contract of the supplier. If the retailer gets the adverse market information, the buyback contract would fail. On the contrary, if the retailer has favorable information, the suppliers profit would decrease with increase of the overconfidence degree. Furthermore, by introducing a revenue sharing contract into the model, the retailers order quantity and the suppliers profit are greatly improved so as to achieve supply chain coordination. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate and confirm the obtained results.

Key words: supply chain coordination, overconfidence, buyback contract