工业工程 ›› 2018, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (2): 27-37.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e17-3206

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑网络零售商有限IT服务能力的产品定价与广告策略分析

李增禄, 聂佳佳, 冯琳   

  1. 西南交通大学 经济管理学院, 四川 成都 610031
  • 收稿日期:2017-08-21 出版日期:2018-04-30 发布日期:2018-05-12
  • 作者简介:李增禄(1991-),男,河南省人,博士研究生,主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理、合作广告优化分析
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71672153);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(26816WTD01);四川省软科学研究计划资助项目(2017ZR0181)

Pricing and Advertising Strategies of the E-retailer under a Limited IT Service Capacity

LI Zenglu, NIE Jiajia, FENG Lin   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China
  • Received:2017-08-21 Online:2018-04-30 Published:2018-05-12

摘要: 研究了网络零售商有限IT服务能力下产品定价与广告投入问题。首先,建立垄断市场中零售商决策模型,研究发现:零售商广告投入水平、零售价格以及消费者剩余都与零售商IT服务能力正相关。其次,在竞争市场中运用博弈论分别建立了两个零售商Nash静态和Stackelberg动态博弈模型。结果显示,零售商动态博弈中所制定的零售价格高于静态博弈时零售价格,而广告投入水平低于静态博弈时的广告投入水平,并且动态博弈时消费者剩余较小。对于零售商1而言静态博弈时最优服务能力大于动态博弈时的最优服务能力,而零售商2结论相反。最后,分析了消费者时间敏感性和广告敏感性对零售商利润以及最优服务能力的影响。

关键词: 有限IT服务能力, 网络零售商, 广告投入, 产品定价

Abstract: A pricing and advertising problem of an e-retailer is studied considering a limited IT service capacity. First, the decision model of monopolized market is established. It is found that the retailer's advertisement, retail price and the consumer surplus are positively correlated with the IT service capacity. Second, the Nash and Stackelberg games are developed to analyze the retailers' decisions in the competitive market. The results show that the retail prices of both retailers in Stackelberg game are higher than those in Nash game, but the advertisements and consumer surplus are lower than those in Nash game. As to retailer 1, the optimal IT service capacity in Stackelberg game is larger than that in Nash game; the result of retailer 2 is the opposite. The influence of the consumer's advertising and time sensitivity on the retailer's optimal profit and IT service capacity is also analyzed.

Key words: limited IT service capacity, e-retailer, ad-investment, pricing

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