工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2011, Vol. 14 ›› Issue (3): 8-13.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于委托-代理理论的政府安全生产管制决策

  

  1. 江苏大学 工商管理学院，江苏 镇江 212013
  • 出版日期:2011-06-30 发布日期:2011-07-08
  • 作者简介:沈斌（1979-），男，江苏省人，博士研究生，主要研究方向为中小企业安全生产管制理论与实践.
  • 基金资助:

     国家自然科学基金资助项目（70773051)；江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目（CX09B_061R）

Study on Government Regulating of Production Safety Based on Commission-Agent Theory

  1. College of Business Administration，Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang  212013，China
  • Online:2011-06-30 Published:2011-07-08

摘要： 从委托-代理角度研究企业安全生产投资决策临界点及政府安全生产管制成本最小化的实现途径。结合考虑安全生产投资收益滞后性理论的基础上，构建了相应的安全生产管制委托-代理模型。通过分析模型发现：在长期和短期，政府和企业之间存在着的委托-代理关系对企业安全生产投资决策和政府安全生产管制成本大小的影响并不相同。

关键词: 委托-代理关系, 生产安全管制, 投资回报滞后

Abstract:   In the regulating of enterprise production safety, the information owned by the government and enterprises is asymmetry. In other words, it is a commissionagent relationship between the government and enterprises. The government owns less information than the enterprises. Based on the commissionagent theory, the tipping point of production safety investment for enterprises and regulating cost for the government are discussed in this paper. A mathematical model is developed to describe the investment by enterprises and the regulating cost for the government on production safety regulating in considering profit return lag. With this model, analysis shows that the longterm influence of the commissionagent relationship between the enterprises and government is different from the shortterm one on the production safety investment made by the enterprises and the regulating cost of the government.

Key words:  commission-relation, production safety regulating, investment return lag