工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2011, Vol. 14 ›› Issue (3): 87-91.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

双边道德风险下创业投资双方投入及激励契约

  

  1. 重庆大学 经济与工商管理学院，重庆 400030
  • 出版日期:2011-06-30 发布日期:2011-07-08
  • 作者简介:蔡永清（1986-），女，河北省人，硕士研究生，主要研究方向为风险投资、风险管理.
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金资助项目（08BJY154）；教育部新世纪人才支持计划（NCET-07-0905）

Study on Venture Capital Input and the Incentive Contract with Bilateral Moral Hazard

  1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China
  • Online:2011-06-30 Published:2011-07-08

摘要： 运用现代契约经济学及信息经济学的基本理论，设计了在双边道德风险条件下创业投资家和创业企业家的线性激励契约。对完全信息下和不完全信息下双方的创业努力投入、资金投入及项目产出等进行了对比分析，并对模型求解，结果表明合约报酬结构对各要素激励作用的影响。通过一个数值算例进一步验证了分析结果，对于我国的创业投资实践具有一定的指导意义。

关键词: 双边道德风险, 创业投资, 激励契约

Abstract: Based on the theory of modern contract and information economics, a linear incentive contract between venture capitalist and venture entrepreneur under bilateral moral hazard condition is designed. With this contract, the efforts and capital investment of both sides, and the output are analyzed with complete and incomplete information. By doing so, it presents how the sharing arrangement in the contract affects the incentive function for the input factors. A numerical example is given to verify the results obtained in this paper.

Key words: bilateral moral hazard, venture capital, incentive contract