大型公共建设项目投资决策听证过程的博弈分析

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在研究讨价还价博弈理论原理的基础上，分析把该理论应用到大型公共建设项目投资决策听证会中的可行性，通过构建听证会中三方非共谋的讨价还价博弈模型，分析模型中各方的策略特征与收益，并对模型的均衡进行分析求解，最后站在不同参与方的角度给出相应的建议。

关键词: 大型公共建设项目, 投资决策, 公众参与, 讨价还价

Abstract:

The investment decision-making hearing of the large public buildings is a complicated and systematic problem in project management decision. It is a very effective and feasible way for the local government, experts and public representations to participate in the investment decision-making by organizing the hearing. Based on studying the principle of bargaining game theory, it will be more suitable to apply this theory in the investment decision-making hearing of the large public buildings. Then, by building a tripartite bargaining game model of non-collusion in the hearing, the benefits and strategies of all parties will be analysed. Finally, the equilibrium of the model will be solved, and corresponding suggestions will be given by standing on the different parties.

Key words: large public buildings, investment decisions, public participation, bargaining

庞永师，施庆伟，李水源，刘景矿. 大型公共建设项目投资决策听证过程的博弈分析[J]. 工业工程.

Pang Yong-shi, Shi Qing-wei, Li Shui-yuan, Liu Jing-kuang. An Analysis of the Game in the Investment Decision-making Hearing of the Large Public Buildings[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal .

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