双渠道订单农业供应链违约问题研究

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2018.04.009

工业工程 ›› 2018, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (4): 68-74.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2018.04.009

双渠道订单农业供应链违约问题研究

冯春, 陈艳娜

西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院, 四川成都 610031

收稿日期:2017-11-28 出版日期:2018-08-30 发布日期:2018-08-27
作者简介:冯春(1970-),男,四川省人,教授,博士,主要研究方向为应急物流与物流系统优化.
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金一般项目资助（17BGL085）

Defaulting Problem of Contract-Farming Supply Chain with Dual Channel

FENG Chun, CHEN Yanna

School of Transportation and Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China

Received:2017-11-28 Online:2018-08-30 Published:2018-08-27

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了分析双渠道情况下“保底收购，随行就市”型订单农业中的违约风险，减少农业合同违约率，利用博弈理论来描述农户和公司之间的交易过程和违约机理，基于逆向归纳法获得公司和农户的最优收购价和最优产量，探讨其分别在集中决策、分散决策以及纳什协商决策模式下的利润分配和行为选择。论文研究发现，在分散决策模式下的合约设计对农户有利，对公司不利，公司存在违约风险；纳什协商模型下的合约设计对农户和公司的利润水平均有利，双方均不会主动违约，该模型下的供应链可以达到稳定状态。同时纳什协商模型下的供应链整体利润大于分散决策模型下的供应链整体利润，且等于集中决策时的供应链利润，该模型可以实现供应链的完美协调。

关键词: 期望利润, 集中决策, 分散决策, 纳什协商

Abstract: To solve the defaulting problem in contract-farming supply chain and reduce the default rate of agricultural contract, game theory is used to model the trading process and default mechanism. Taking backward induction, the optimal purchase price and quantity are obtained. The profit distribution and behavior selectionunder different models also are discussed. It is found that the contract design in the decentralized decision-making model is beneficial to the farmers, and the company is not favored and has the risk of default. The contract design under the Nash negotiation model is beneficial to both sides, and neither of them breaches the contract. The supply chain can reach a steady state. The overall profit of the supply chain under the Nash negotiation model is greater than the overall profit of the supply chain under the decentralized decision-making model, and is equal to the supply chain profit under centralized decision-making model. The model can achieve the perfect coordination of the supply chain.

Key words: expected profit, centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making, Nash negotiation

中图分类号:

F224.3

冯春, 陈艳娜. 双渠道订单农业供应链违约问题研究[J]. 工业工程, 2018, 21(4): 68-74.

FENG Chun, CHEN Yanna. Defaulting Problem of Contract-Farming Supply Chain with Dual Channel[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2018, 21(4): 68-74.

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双渠道订单农业供应链违约问题研究

Defaulting Problem of Contract-Farming Supply Chain with Dual Channel

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