政府不同研发补贴政策下的企业市场绩效

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了研究政府的研究与开发（R&D）补贴政策，建立了双寡头市场中面向R&D工艺的三阶段博弈模型。第一阶段为政府补贴阶段，分为两种情况：一是政府对企业进行R&D投入补贴;二是对企业进行产品创新补贴。政府以社会总福利最大为目标选择R&D补贴率；第二阶段为R&D合作阶段，两企业以它们的总利润最大为目标选择R&D投入水平；第三阶段为产品市场竞争阶段，企业选择产品产量在市场上进行古诺竞争。用逆向归纳法求出了研发卡特尔策略下的古诺—纳什均衡解。研究表明，当企业采用研发卡特尔策略时，政府对产品创新的补贴力度要远高于对R&D投入的补贴力度。对产品创新进行补贴的方式优于对R&D投入进行补贴，它能促使企业以相对较少的研发投入带来较多的产品、较高的企业利润和较高的社会总福利水平。

关键词: 古诺竞争, 研究与开发, 政府研究与开发补贴

Abstract: Aiming at the analysis of the effect of government research and development (R&D) subsidy policies on the firm’s performance in a duopoly market, a three stage game model is established. The first stage is for the government R&D subsidy situation, including: 1) the government gives the subsidy for the R&D investment of a firm; (2) the government gives the subsidy to encourage a firm for R&D in product innovation. They are called the first and second subsidy policies. In this stage, the government determines the R&D subsidy rate to maximize the total social welfare. The second stage models the R&D cooperation between enterprises and the enterprises determine the R&D level to maximize the total profit. The third stage is for product competition and the enterprises determine the output level to maximize their profit. Based on the model, by means of backward induction, the CournotNash equilibrium solutions under R&D cartel strategy are acquired. It shows that, when the cartel R&D strategy is applied, the government subsidy rate resulting from the second policy is much greater than that resulting from the first policy. Thus, the second R&D subsidy policy is superior to the first one, for it makes the firms to invest less but create more output, profit, and social total welfare.

Key words: Cournot competition, research and development (R&D); government R&D subsidy

方海燕1,2，达庆利2，朱长宁1. 政府不同研发补贴政策下的企业市场绩效[J]. 工业工程, 2012, 15(2): 33-40.

Fang Haiyan1,2, Da Qingli2, Zhu Changlin1. Firms Market Performance Analysis under Different Government R&D Subsidy Policies[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2012, 15(2): 33-40.

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