Abstract: Based on the concern of supply chain members about fairness, the efficiency of supply chain cooperation is taken as the research object and the fairness and neutrality of members as the basis. The efficiency of supply chain cooperation in three cases is discussed:only retailers have equity concern, only manufacturers have equity concern, and both manufacturers and retailers have equity concern. The maximum utility in three cases is found by Stackelberg game among two-level supply chain members, and then the cooperative efficiency of the three cases is calculated on the basis of fair and neutral utility. The research results show that when retailers or both parties have equity concerns, the cooperation efficiency will decrease in some interval, and the supply chain members can improve the cooperation efficiency through reasonable design of equity concern factors. When manufacturers only pay attention to fairness, cooperation efficiency increases with equity concern factor, and manufacturers can consider setting equity concern factor to improve cooperation efficiency within a reasonable range.

Key words: random needs, cooperative efficiency, equity concerns