集中控制型VMI&TPL供应链的协调研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 以基本的RS契约为基础，研究了如何实现随机需求下集中控制型VMI&TPL供应链的协调。鉴于基本的RS契约失效，设计了一种由各成员共担库存风险的风险共担型RS契约，进一步提出了基于不对称Nash协商的风险共担型RS契约。研究表明，风险共担型RS契约仅能实现供应链整体期望收益的Pareto最优，而基于不对称Nash协商的风险共担型RS契约则能同时实现供应链整体期望收益的Pareto最优和各成员期望收益的Pareto改进。

关键词: 供应链管理, 供应商管理库存, 第三方物流, 收益共享契约, 不对称Nash协商

Abstract: The coordination problem of a supply chain under vendor managed inventory (VMI) mode with third party logistics (TPL) is studied in this paper. In the supply chain, the demands are subject to random disturbance. It is assume that the supply chain is coordinated by revenue sharing (RS) contract and it is operated under centralized control mode. Consider that the basic RS contract is no longer effective, an RS contract with the stock risk shared by retailer, supplier, and TPL is proposed to coordinate the supply chain. This contract is further extended to the RS contract combined with risk-sharing under Asymmetric Nash Negotiation. With these contracts, analysis is carried out. Results show that while the RS contract with risk-sharing can maximize the expected revenue of whole supply chain, the one with risk-sharing under Asymmetric Nash Negotiation can coordinate the supply chain well and at the same time the Pareto improvement for every member's expected revenue can be achieved.

刘阳, 赵道致, 何龙飞. 集中控制型VMI&TPL供应链的协调研究[J]. 工业工程, 2012, 15(4): 41-46.

Liu Yang, Zhao Dao-zhi, He Long-fei. A Research on Coordination of VMI&TPL Supply Chain under Centralized Control[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2012, 15(4): 41-46.

参考文献

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