工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2019, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (6): 17-26.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2019.06.003

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑政府激励政策的绿色供应链博弈模型及契约协调研究

王新林1, 胡盛强2, 刘晓斌3   

  1. 1. 广东工业大学 管理学院, 广东 广州 510520;
    2. 广东财经大学 工商管理学院, 广东 广州 510320;
    3. 广东财经大学 国际商学院, 广东 广州 510320
  • 收稿日期:2019-02-18 发布日期:2019-12-24
  • 作者简介:王新林(1978-),男,湖南省人,博士研究生,主要研究方向为供应链管理、互联网金融
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目（71271060）；教育部人文社会科学研究一般资助项目（17YJC630042）；广东省教育厅人文社科类特色创新资助项目（2017WTSCX043）；广州市哲学社会科学规划资助项目（2016GZQN14，2018GZQN37）；广东财经大学“创新强校工程”国际科研合作平台“智慧创业研究室”资助项目

Green Supply Chain Game Models and Contract Coordination with Government Incentives

WANG Xinlin1, HU Shengqiang2, LIU Xiaobin3   

  1. 1. School of Management, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520, China;
    2. School of Business Administration, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics, Guangzhou 510320, China;
    3. School of International Business, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics, Guangzhou 510320, China
  • Received:2019-02-18 Published:2019-12-24

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摘要： 研究政府的激励政策对于制造商研发设计绿色产品以及供应链协调机制的影响。通过构建集中决策下的垂直博弈模型、分散决策下制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型，分别得到均衡的绿色度、定价策略以及各组织利润。在此基础上提出了基于收益共享或成本共担契约的供应链协调机制，得到最优的成本共担与收益共享比例。利用数值分析对上述结论进行验证，并进行了参数敏感度分析。研究表明，相比于分散决策，集中决策下的绿色度更大、零售价更低、供应链整体利润更大。单一的成本共担契约无法实现供应链协调；对于综合契约协调机制，收益共享比例与成本共担比例负相关。各组织利润与绿色产品单位补贴调节因子以及绿色度敏感度系数正相关、与价格敏感度系数以及绿色投资系数负相关。

关键词: 绿色供应链, 政府激励, 博弈模型, 收益共享契约, 成本共担契约, 优化

Abstract: For the green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer while consumers are sensitive to the price and greenness of green products, an investigation is conducted into how the government's incentive policy affects the manufacturer's decision-making about green products' greenness and supply chain coordination mechanism. A vertical game model under centralized decision-making and manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model under decentralized decision-making is established to get the optimal price, greenness and profits of every organization. Then, cost-sharing or revenue sharing contracts are proposed to coordinate the supply chain. The above conclusions are verified through a numerical analysis and the parameters sensitivity analysis is carried out. The study indicates that:compared with decentralized decision-making, under centralized decision, the greater the green degree is, the lower the retail price is and the higher the overall profits of the supply chain are; and a single cost-sharing contract cannot achieve supply chain coordination; and for the revenue sharing contracts combined with cost sharing, the ratio of revenue sharing is negatively related to the ratio of cost sharing; the profits of each member are positively correlated with the adjustment factors of government subsidies and the coefficient of greenness sensitivity but negatively correlated with coefficients of the price sensitivity and the green investment.

Key words: green supply chain, government incentives, game model, revenue sharing contract, cost sharing contract, optimization

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