不对称信息下液化石油气企业代理销售机制设计

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e16-1216

工业工程 ›› 2017, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (2): 7-13.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e16-1216

不对称信息下液化石油气企业代理销售机制设计

姬光¹, 胡明茂^1,2, 齐二石¹, 李建国¹

1. 天津大学管理与经济学部, 天津 300072;
2. 湖北汽车工业学院机械工程学院, 湖北十堰 442002

收稿日期:2016-08-10 出版日期:2017-04-30 发布日期:2017-05-13
通讯作者: 胡明茂(1980-),男,山东省人,副教授,博士,主要研究方向为工业工程、机械设计、制造供应链管理.
作者简介:姬光(1965-),男,山东省人,副教授,博士,主要研究方向为企业管理.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71401158）；中国博士后科学基金第58批面上项目（2015581302）；湖北省自然科学基金资助项目（2014CFB625）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目（15YJC630162）

A Design of LPG Enterprise Agent Selling Mechanism with Asymmetric Information

JI Guang¹, HU Mingmao^1,2, QI Ershi¹, LI Jianguo¹

1. College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China;
2. Mechanical Engineering College, Hubei University of Automotive Industry, Shiyan 442002, China

Received:2016-08-10 Online:2017-04-30 Published:2017-05-13

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于机制设计中的委托代理理论分析不对称信息下液化石油气（LPG）企业代理销售的合同机制设计问题。建立了液化石油气企业期望收益最大化的委托代理模型，分析了模型的目标函数、激励相容约束和参与约束，通过变分法分析得到了最优的转移支付和销量函数。结果表明随着代理商服务水平的增加，销量和向代理商收取的转移支付都递增，但代理商汇报真实服务水平时所获得的收益最大。最后通过数值算例验证模型的可行性。

关键词: 机制设计, 委托代理, 液化石油气（LPG）企业, 代理销售

Abstract: A mechanism for LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) enterprise agent selling with asymmetric information is designed and analyzed. A principal-agent model is established to maximize the profit of the LPG enterprise, and the salve volume function and the transfer payment can be obtained through variational method after analyzing the objective function, the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint. The sales volume and the transfer payment are increasing with the increase of the service level, while the selling agent can only obtain the maximum profit when he/she reports the true service level. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.

Key words: mechanism design, principal-agent, LPG enterprise, agent selling

中图分类号:

F253

姬光, 胡明茂, 齐二石, 李建国. 不对称信息下液化石油气企业代理销售机制设计[J]. 工业工程, 2017, 20(2): 7-13.

JI Guang, HU Mingmao, QI Ershi, LI Jianguo. A Design of LPG Enterprise Agent Selling Mechanism with Asymmetric Information[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2017, 20(2): 7-13.

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不对称信息下液化石油气企业代理销售机制设计

A Design of LPG Enterprise Agent Selling Mechanism with Asymmetric Information

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