基于委托代理理论的建设项目多要素协同激励控制模型研究

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2020.01.013

工业工程 ›› 2020, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (1): 96-103.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2020.01.013

基于委托代理理论的建设项目多要素协同激励控制模型研究

吉格迪, 杨康

内蒙古工业大学经济管理学院, 内蒙古呼和浩特 010051

收稿日期:2019-04-02 发布日期:2020-02-21
作者简介:吉格迪(1977-),男,蒙古族,内蒙古自治区人,教授,主要研究方向为项目管理
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71661026)；内蒙古自然科学基金资助项目(2019MS07017)；北京市教委科技计划一般项目(KM201810853003)

A Multi-factor Cooperative Incentive Control Model of Construction Projects Based on Principal Agent Theory

JI Gedi, YANG Kang

School of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia Industrial University, Hohhot 010051, China

Received:2019-04-02 Published:2020-02-21

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 激励控制是确保项目工期、质量和成本目标实现的基础，传统的建筑项目激励模型多考虑的是一个或某两个目标的激励控制。有关多要素激励模型的研究尚不成熟。没有考虑到多要素之间的关联性，以及质量目标难以量化等。这容易导致建筑项目在施工过程中忽视一些重要因素，造成无法挽回的损失。针对上述问题，本文引入挣值管理(earned value method, EVM)中两个基本业绩测度，同时将质量因素量化，考虑多要素间的可替代性，建立了一个多要素委托代理模型，并对模型的应用条件进行了说明。进一步给出了最优激励强度的计算方法以及模型的应用步骤。最后，进行了案例研究和数据模拟。

关键词: 多要素, 委托代理理论, 挣值管理

Abstract: Incentive control is the basis for ensuring the project duration, quality and cost objectives. The literature review finds that traditional incentive model of construction project usually considers one or two objectives. Researches on multi-factor incentive models are not yet mature: not considering the correlation between multiple factors, and the quality objectives are difficult to quantify. This may lead to neglecting some important factors in the process of construction, resulting in the irretrievable loss. In view of the above problems, two basic performance measures in EVM system are used, quality quantified, considering substitutability between multi-factors, establishing a multi-factor principal-agent model, and illustrating the application conditions of the model. Furthermore, a calculation method is derived for optimal incentive strength, and the application steps listed. Finally, a case study and data simulation are carried out.

Key words: multi-factor, principal agent theory, earned value management

中图分类号:

C935

吉格迪, 杨康. 基于委托代理理论的建设项目多要素协同激励控制模型研究[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(1): 96-103.

JI Gedi, YANG Kang. A Multi-factor Cooperative Incentive Control Model of Construction Projects Based on Principal Agent Theory[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2020, 23(1): 96-103.

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基于委托代理理论的建设项目多要素协同激励控制模型研究

A Multi-factor Cooperative Incentive Control Model of Construction Projects Based on Principal Agent Theory

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