基于合作博弈的电力生产商多能互补优化策略

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2020.03.011

工业工程 ›› 2020, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (3): 84-90.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2020.03.011

基于合作博弈的电力生产商多能互补优化策略

孙权, 李军祥

上海理工大学管理学院，上海 200093

收稿日期:2019-07-05 发布日期:2020-07-04
通讯作者: 李军祥(1971-)，男，山东省人，教授，博士/博士后，博导，主要研究方向为管理科学与工程. Email：lijx@usst.edu.cn E-mail:lijx@usst.edu.cn
作者简介:孙权(1994-)，男，浙江省人，硕士研究生，主要研究方向为智能电网实时定价及博弈论应用
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572113, 71432007, 71871144)；国家自然科学基金匹配项目资助(1P16303003, 2020KJFZ034, 2019KJFZ048, 2018KJFZ035)；上海理工大学大学生创新训练计划资助项目(XJ2019156)

Multi-Energy Complementary Optimization Strategy of Power Producers Based on Cooperative Game

SUN Quan, LI Junxiang

School of Management, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China

Received:2019-07-05 Published:2020-07-04

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了稳定电网系统，消纳清洁能源并提高电力生产商利润，提出将现有的化石能源、风能和太阳能发电资源通过合作博弈的方式建立多能互补发电策略模型来满足用户的全部电力需求，通过Shapley值法对电力生产商利益进行合理地分配。为了验证策略可行性，设置3类电力生产商在5种不同合作策略下运作。仿真结果表明，多能互补最优策略下电力生产商单日供电量极差减少了32%，化石燃料、风力和光伏发电电力生产商单日利润分别提高了15.9%、45.5%和65.0%。结果表明，所提策略是正确且行之有效的，具有指导价值。

关键词: 智能电网, 多能互补, 电力生产商, 合作博弈, Shapley值法

Abstract: In order to reduce energy waste, stabilize the power grid system, absorb clean energy and increase the revenue of power producers, the existing fossil energy resources, wind power resources and solar power resources are integrated to establish a multi-energy complementary power generation strategy model through cooperative game to meet the power requirements of all users. The Shapley value method is used to distribute the interests of these power producers reasonably. In order to verify the feasibility of the strategy, three types of power producers are set up to operate under five different cooperation strategies. The simulation results show that under the multi-energy complementary optimal strategy, the daily power supply range of power producers is reduced by 32%, and the daily profits of fossil fuel, wind and photovoltaic power producers are increased by 15.9%, 45.5% and 65.0%, respectively. The results show that the proposed strategy is correct and effective and has a guiding value.

Key words: smart grid, multi-energy complementary, power producer, cooperative game, Shapley value method

中图分类号:

TP391

孙权, 李军祥. 基于合作博弈的电力生产商多能互补优化策略[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(3): 84-90.

SUN Quan, LI Junxiang. Multi-Energy Complementary Optimization Strategy of Power Producers Based on Cooperative Game[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2020, 23(3): 84-90.

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基于合作博弈的电力生产商多能互补优化策略

Multi-Energy Complementary Optimization Strategy of Power Producers Based on Cooperative Game

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