广告视角下智能小区实时定价博弈分析

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2019.03.010

工业工程 ›› 2019, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (3): 77-85.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2019.03.010

广告视角下智能小区实时定价博弈分析

李陆¹, 代业明²

1. 青岛大学数学与统计学院, 山东青岛 266071;
2. 青岛大学商学院, 山东青岛 266071

收稿日期:2018-10-17 出版日期:2019-06-30 发布日期:2019-06-27
通讯作者: 代业明(1975-),男,河南省人,副教授,博士,主要研究方向为电网定价机制、博弈论及其应用.E-mail:yemingdai@163.com E-mail:yemingdai@163.com
作者简介:李陆(1995-),男,山东省人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为电网定价机制、博弈论及其应用
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（11171221，71571108）；中国博士后科学基金资助项目（2016M602104）；青岛市博士后应用研究资助项目（2016033）

Real-time Pricing Based on Game Theory in Smart Community from Advertisement Perspective

LI Lu¹, DAI Yeming²

1. School of Mathematics & Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China;
2. School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China

Received:2018-10-17 Online:2019-06-30 Published:2019-06-27

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 考虑连续时间内供电商对用户的争抢行为，将广告微分博弈引入智能电网系统中以刻画供电商之间的相互竞争，并建立多供电商多用户Stackelberg博弈模型研究智能电网实时定价问题。通过求解用户侧优化问题及供电商之间非合作微分博弈纳什均衡，最终获得供电商与用户之间Stackelberg博弈均衡，以此得到供电商广告竞争下的智能电网实时电价。数值仿真结果表明：采取广告行为供电商的最大支付随其广告成本和定价先增后减，而随用户规模扩大而递增；另外，随着单位广告成本的增加，供电商统一电价逐渐降低，带来用户效用提高，且拥有较低广告成本的供电商售电较多。

关键词: 智能电网, 需求响应管理, 实时电价, 微分博弈, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: Considering the competition behavior of electricity suppliers in continuous time slots, advertising differential game theory is introduced to depict the interaction among electricity suppliers. A Stackelberg game model with multiple leaders and multiple followers is formulated to study the real-time electricity pricing problem. By solving the optimal problem on user side and the non-cooperative differential Nash equilibrium among electricity suppliers, the Stackelberg game equilibrium between the suppliers and users is achieved. Finally, the real-time electricity price under the advertising competition of electricity suppliers is obtained. The results of numerical simulation show that the maximum payment of electricity suppliers taking advertising behavior increases first and then decreases with the increase of its advertising cost and price, but increases with the increase of user scale. In addition, with the increase of unit advertising cost, the uniform electricity price of electricity suppliers gradually decreases and the user's utility is improved. Moreover, the electricity suppliers with lower advertising cost sell more electricity.

Key words: smart grid, demand response management, real-time pricing, differential game, Stackelberg game

中图分类号:

O225
TM73

李陆, 代业明. 广告视角下智能小区实时定价博弈分析[J]. 工业工程, 2019, 22(3): 77-85.

LI Lu, DAI Yeming. Real-time Pricing Based on Game Theory in Smart Community from Advertisement Perspective[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2019, 22(3): 77-85.

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广告视角下智能小区实时定价博弈分析

Real-time Pricing Based on Game Theory in Smart Community from Advertisement Perspective

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