工业工程 ›› 2022, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (3): 89-94.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2022.03.010

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

网络平台市场的质量信息披露策略与激励机制分析

王虹   

  1. 南京林业大学 经济管理学院,江苏 南京 210037
  • 收稿日期:2021-01-05 发布日期:2022-07-06
  • 作者简介:王虹(1981—),女,山东省人,副教授,博士,主要研究方向为平台运营管理、供应链管理
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(20YJC630142)

A Research on Information Disclosure of Quality and Incentive Mechanism in Platform Selling

WANG Hong   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing Forestry University, Nanjing 210037, China
  • Received:2021-01-05 Published:2022-07-06

摘要: 针对网络平台市场中产品质量信息不对称的现象,分析平台企业的质量检测策略以及信息披露策略。分析可知,当质量检测成本不高时,平台企业在一定情况下会选择对卖家产品进行质量检测,并且在检测到高质量产品时对外发布质量信号。否则,在缺乏相应激励机制时,平台企业不会选择披露产品质量信息甚至不进行质量检测。通过构建卖方与平台企业的博弈模型,设计激励卖方提高产品质量、平台企业质量检测与信息披露的相应机制。从政府相关机构、卖方的角度,提出促进网络平台健康发展的相应建议。

关键词: 平台企业, 不对称信息, 信息披露, 激励机制

Abstract: Considering the asymmetry of product quality information in e-commerce platform market, the information disclosure strategy of the platform and the seller's quality decision are analyzed. The results show that, the platform enterprise will choose to check the seller's product quality when the cost of quality inspection is not high. When the product is high-quality, the quality signal is sent. Otherwise, the platform enterprise will not check the product quality and also not disclose the real information when lacking corresponding incentive mechanisms. A game model between the seller and the platform enterprise is constructed. The mechanisms are designed to encourage the seller to improve the quality and the platform enterprise to check and disclose the information. From the perspective of the relevant government agencies and the seller, the corresponding suggestions about promoting the platform healthy development are proposed.

Key words: platform enterprise, asymmetric information, information disclosure, incentive mechanism

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