“双碳”目标下政企及第三方检测机构三方演化博弈分析

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.220211

工业工程 ›› 2024, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (1): 145-154.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.220211

“双碳”目标下政企及第三方检测机构三方演化博弈分析

刘琦铀, 徐禧洛, 张成科

广东工业大学经济学院，广东广州 510520

收稿日期:2022-10-25 发布日期:2024-03-05
通讯作者: 张成科 (1964—)，男，瑶族，广西壮族自治区人，教授，博士，主要研究方向为管理博弈论及其应用、经济系统建模与计算机仿真等。Email: zhangck@gdut.edu.cn E-mail:zhangck@gdut.edu.cn
作者简介:刘琦铀 (1983—)，男，江西省人，副教授，博士，主要研究方向为低碳供应链优化、供应链金融
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年基金资助项目 (71803029)；广东省自然科学基金资助面上项目 (2019A1515011473)

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Among Government, Enterprises and Third-party Detection Institutions with the Goal of Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutralization

LIU Qiyou, XU Xiluo, ZHANG Chengke

School of Economics, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520, China

Received:2022-10-25 Published:2024-03-05

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对政府低碳规制下，制造商与第三方机构合谋寻租，导致市面上“伪绿色产品”频现等问题，构建由政府监管部门、制造商和第三方检测机构组成的三方参与主体演化博弈模型。在此基础上，探讨各参与主体演化博弈稳定策略组合及实现条件。通过数值仿真分析，阐明制造商寻租及投机成本、生产高绿色和低绿色产品成本差值、第三方检测机构寻租成本及收益、政府监管部门对制造商及第三方机构的奖惩力度等因素对三方参与主体策略选择及系统优化稳定性的影响，以期为“双碳”目标下政府激励与监管政策制定提供参考。

关键词: 低碳生产优化, 合谋寻租, 演化博弈

Abstract: Under the government's low-carbon regulation, manufacturers and third-party detection institutions may conspire to seek rent, which leads to the frequent occurrence of “pseudo-green products” on the market. This paper builds a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of government, manufacturers, and third-party detection institutions. On this basis, the combination of stable strategies and implementation conditions for each participant are explored. Finally, through numerical simulation analysis, the impact of multiple factors, including the rent-seeking and speculative cost of manufacturers, the cost difference between producing high and low green products, the rent-seeking cost and benefits of third-party detection institutions, and the incentives and punishments for manufacturers and third-party detection institutions by government, on strategy selections of three participants and the stability of system optimization is discussed, to provide reference for government incentive and regulatory policies with the goal of carbon peaking and carbon neutralization.

Key words: optimization of low-carbon production, rent-seeking conspiracy, evolutionary game

中图分类号:

F425
F274

刘琦铀, 徐禧洛, 张成科. “双碳”目标下政企及第三方检测机构三方演化博弈分析[J]. 工业工程, 2024, 27(1): 145-154.

LIU Qiyou, XU Xiluo, ZHANG Chengke. Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Among Government, Enterprises and Third-party Detection Institutions with the Goal of Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutralization[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2024, 27(1): 145-154.

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“双碳”目标下政企及第三方检测机构三方演化博弈分析

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Among Government, Enterprises and Third-party Detection Institutions with the Goal of Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutralization

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