工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2014, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (1): 120-125.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑碳税条件的企业管理激励与技术许可方式

  

  1. 1. 江苏省行政学院 工商管理教研部, 江苏 南京 210009; 2.南京工业大学 经济与管理学院，江苏 南京 210009
  • 出版日期:2014-02-28 发布日期:2014-03-14
  • 作者简介:马胡杰(1990-),男,江苏省人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为供应链管理、行为运作管理.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071075,71173103)；国家社科基金重大项目(12&ZD204)；教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJA790183,12YJC630180)

Managerial Incentive and Optimal Technology Licensing of- Firm in Considering Carbon Tax

  1. 1. Business Administration Department, Jiangsu Administration Institute, Nanjing 210009, China;
    2. College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Technology, Nanjing 210009, China
  • Online:2014-02-28 Published:2014-03-14

摘要： 文章讨论了当存在碳税和管理激励的条件下，企业拥有低碳技术时技术转让方式的最优选择问题。运用基于博弈论的数量竞争模型和讨价还价模型，假定双寡头市场中某企业拥有低碳技术，具体研究了存在管理激励条件下的固定费用和比例抽成两种技术许可方式。结果表明：显著创新情形下，创新企业不会将技术许可给其他企业使用。非显著创新情形下，当创新在特定幅度以内时，创新企业愿意进行技术许可；但当创新超过特定幅度时，只有在比例抽成方式下，企业才愿意进行技术许可。对创新企业而言，比例抽成的技术许可方式优于固定费用许可方式，管理激励的存在与否会影响创新企业在进行比例抽成许可方式时的最大抽成比例，而不同的技术许可方式也会对企业内部的均衡管理激励程度产生影响。

关键词: 碳税, 博弈分析, 管理激励

Abstract: With the carbon tax and managerial incentive being imposed, the optimal selection problem of transfer of low carbon technology is discussed. It assumes that, in a duopoly market under managerial incentive with regard to the carbon tax, one of the firms has a lowcarbon technology. Based on Cournot competition model and bargaining model, fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing are studied by using game theory. It shows that, if the innovation is drastic, the firm does not want to license its low carbon technology. If the innovation is nondrastic, whether the firm is willing to license its technology or not depends on how drastic the innovation is. Royalty licensing is always better than fixed-fee licensing for the innovative firm. There is a managerial incentive that affects the amount of the royalty. Further, different technology licensing influences the firm's equilibrium managerial incentive.

Key words: carbon tax, game theoretical analysis, managerial incentive