考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链订货决策

工业工程 ›› 2014, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (2): 99-105.

考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链订货决策

南京工业大学经济与管理学院，江苏南京 211816

出版日期:2014-04-30 发布日期:2014-06-05
作者简介:洪美娜（1992-），女，江苏省人，硕士研究生，主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71071075,71301073）;教育部人文社科青年基金项目（12YJC630180）

Ordering Decision of Fresh Agricultural Product Supply Chain with Fairness Concer

School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Technology, Nanjing 211816, China

Online:2014-04-30 Published:2014-06-05

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 考虑零售商的公平关切行为特征，研究鲜活农产品供应链最优订货决策问题。引入公平关切度和参考依赖因子，构建基于零售商公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链订货决策模型。理论分析与数值算例表明：分散式决策中，零售商考虑公平关切时的订购量少于其无公平关切时的订购量，批发价随着公平关切程度的上升而下降；批发价契约下考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链无法实现协调，但订购量、供应链成员的利润均随着公平关切程度的上升而减少。

关键词: 鲜活农产品, 供应链管理, 公平关切, 批发价契约

Abstract: With the behavior of the retailers fairness concern, the optimal ordering decision of fresh agricultural product is studied in this paper. An order decision model of fresh agricultural product supply chain is developed by using both degree of fairness concern and reference dependent factor. Theoretical analysis and numerical examples show that the ordering quantity when the retailer considers fairness is lower than that when the retailer does not consider fairness. Also, when the retailers fairness concern gets higher, the suppliers wholesale price would get lower in a decentralized supply chain. In addition, the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate a fresh agricultural product supply chain in this scenario. However, the retailers quantity decreases as the fairness concern becomes higher and the profit of the retailer and supplier members also decrease.

Key words: fresh agricultural product, supply chain management, fairness concern, wholesale price contract

洪美娜，孙玉玲，石岿然. 考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链订货决策[J]. 工业工程, 2014, 17(2): 99-105.

Hong Mei-na, Sun Yu-ling, Shi Kui-ran. Ordering Decision of Fresh Agricultural Product Supply Chain with Fairness Concer[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2014, 17(2): 99-105.

参考文献

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