工业工程 ›› 2014, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (3): 61-67.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于补贴与碳税的闭环供应链定价策略

  

  1. 天津大学 管理与经济学部,天津 300072
  • 出版日期:2014-06-30 发布日期:2014-07-14
  • 作者简介:高举红(1966-),天津市人,副教授,博士,主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理.
  • 基金资助:

    教育部留学回国人员科研启动基金资助项目(580-413007-0301)

Pricing Strategy of Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on-Subsidy and Carbon Tax

  1. College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
  • Online:2014-06-30 Published:2014-07-14

摘要: 针对由单一制造商、单一零售商和单一第三方组成的闭环供应链,利用Stackelberg博弈,研究了分散决策下基于补贴、碳税、补贴和碳税的奖惩机制决策的闭环供应链定价策略。结果表明,基于补贴和碳税的奖惩机制决策更能有效降低闭环供应链碳排放量、提高回收率。通过数值算例验证了基于补贴和碳税的奖惩机制的有效性。

关键词: 闭环供应链, 补贴与碳税, 奖惩机制, Stackelberg博弈, 定价策略

Abstract: A closedloop supply chain (CLSC) composed of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a thirdparty is addressed in this paper. The supply chain is governed by the premium and penalty mechanism which is composed of subsidization or carbon taxation or subsidization and carbon taxation. The Stackelberg game theory is used to study the pricing strategy for such a supply chain under decentralized decision. The results show that premium and penalty mechanism based on subsidization and carbon taxation can effectively reduce not only the carbon emissions, but also enhance collection rate. By using numerical examples, the effectiveness of the premium and penalty mechanism based on subsidization and carbon taxation is validated.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, subsidy and carbon tax, premium and penalty mechanism, Stackelberg game, pricing strategy