An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multi-agent Co-governance of Online Food Safety

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2022.02.001

Abstract

Abstract: In order to discuss the effectiveness of online food safety governance under the co-governance scenario, an evolutionary game model of online food safety co-governance with the participation of platforms, governments and consumers is constructed. Through the calculation and simulation analysis, the evolutionary equilibrium law of online food safety governance is revealed. It is found that when the evolution of online food safety governance reaches the equilibrium point, there are four different evolutionary stability strategy combinations between the platforms and the enterprises. When the co-governance mode meets the following two conditions, food enterprises in the online market will continue selling safe food: (1) The cost difference between selling safe food and unsafe food is less than the sum of the losses caused by government punishment and negative online reviews; and (2) platform negative regulation punishment is greater than the positive regulation of investment, meanwhile the cost difference between selling safe food and unsafe food is greater than the sum of the losses caused by government punishment and negative online reviews, but less than the overall punishment from the government, platform, and negative comments to the enterprises. In order to ensure the effective supply of safe food, the government departments should improve the probabilities of investigation and increase punishment for the enterprises and the platform, the platform should reduce the fees for enterprises to enter the platform, and consumers can actively participate in food safety governance through online reviews.

Key words: online food safety, co-governance, evolutionary game theory

CLC Number:

TS201.6

SHEN Cong, WEI Mingxia, XIA Yu, SHENG Yilong. An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multi-agent Co-governance of Online Food Safety[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2022, 25(2): 1-12.

References

[1] ANTLE J M. Economic analysis of food safety[J]. Handbook of Agricultural Economics, 2001, 1(10): 83-136
[2] WANG O, SOMOGYI S. Consumer adoption of online food shopping in China[J]. British Food Journal, 2018, 120(12): 2868-2884
[3] 樊相宇, 刘智宝, 武小平. 考虑消费者辨识能力的冷链博弈分析[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 20(6): 28-34+59
FAN Xiangyu, LIU Zhibao, WU Xiaoping. A cold chain game analysis considering consumer identification ability[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2020, 20(6): 28-34+59
[4] 孙峰. 网售自制食品的法律规制研究[J]. 法学杂志, 2019, 40(4): 138-146
SUN Feng. Research on legal regulations for homemade food in online marketing[J]. Law Science Magazine, 2019, 40(4): 138-146
[5] 钟筱红, 周建云. 网络进口食品安全监管法律问题研究[J]. 江西社会科学, 2018, 39(5): 195-201
[6] 刘鹏, 李文韬. 网络订餐食品安全监管: 基于智慧监管理论的视角[J]. 华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2018, 64(1): 1-9
LIU Peng, LI Wentao. Food safety regulation of online meal ordering: A study from the perspective of smart regulation[J]. Journal of Central China Normal University (Humanities and Social Sciences), 2018, 64(1): 1-9
[7] 颜海娜, 于静. 网络订餐食品安全“运动式”治理困境探究——一个新制度主义的分析框架[J]. 北京行政学院学报, 2018, 20(3): 81-90
YAN Haina, YU Jing. An investigation of the dilemma of the mobilized governance of the food security of online meal ordering: a new-institutional analytical framework[J]. Journal of Beijing Administration Institute, 2018, 20(3): 81-90
[8] 刘金瑞. 网络食品交易第三方平台责任的理解适用与制度创新[J]. 东方法学, 2017, 10(4): 84-92
[9] 费威, 翟越, 时亚星. 网络订餐平台规模与其食品安全监管努力关系分析[J]. 商业研究, 2017, 60(8): 150-157
FEI Wei, ZHAI Yue, SHI Yaxing. An analysis of the relationship between platform scale of the network ordering and its food safety supervision effort[J]. Commercial Research, 2017, 60(8): 150-157
[10] CHEN J, LI W. Construction and perfection of the responsibility of third-party platform providers of the online food trade in China[J]. Biotechnology Law Report, 2019, 38(5): 294-302
[11] 赵鹏. 超越平台责任: 网络食品交易规制模式之反思[J]. 华东政法大学学报, 2017, 20(1): 60-71
[12] 刘永胜, 甘莹莹, 徐广姝. 网购食品供应链平台与平台卖家信号传递的博弈[J]. 商业研究, 2018, 61(10): 19-27
LIU Yongsheng, GAN Yingying XU Guangshu. The game of signal transmission between online shopping food supply chain platform and platform seller[J]. Commercial Research, 2018, 61(10): 19-27
[13] 张红霞. 消费者对网购食品安全信任的影响因素分析[J]. 软科学, 2018, 32(5): 116-119
ZHANG Hongxia. Research on the influencing factors of consumer trust on online food safety[J]. Soft Science, 2018, 32(5): 116-119
[14] HE H, ZHU L. Online shopping green product quality supervision strategy with consumer feedback and collusion behavior[J/OL]. (2020-03-03). https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov./32126092.
[15] 王建华, 王恒, 孙俊. 基于订餐平台视角的食品安全监管策略[J]. 经济与管理, 2020, 34(3): 79-85
WANG Jianhua, WANG Heng, SUN Jun. Research on food safety supervision strategy based on ordering platform[J]. Economy and Management, 2020, 34(3): 79-85
[16] LI Y, WEN D, SUN X. Quality supervision game between government and online shopping platforms[J]. Total Quality Management & Business Excellence, 2018, 29(9): 1246-1258
[17] 霍红, 白艺彩. 基于互联网环境的生鲜农产品质量安全控制研究[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(6): 52-59
HUO Hong, BAI Yicai. A research on quality and safety control of fresh agricultural products under internet environment[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2020, 23(6): 52-59
[18] MARTINEZ M G, FEARNE A, CASWELL J A, et al. Co-regulation as a possible model for food safety governance: Opportunities for public–private partnerships[J]. Food Policy, 2007, 32(3): 299-314
[19] FRIEDMAN D. Evolutionary games in economics[J]. Econometrica, 1991, 59(3): 637-666