Abstract: In order to encourage the upstream and downstream enterprises in agricultural supply chains to actively implement preservation, a bargaining cost-sharing contract is presented. The specific sharing proportion of preservation cost is derived, which supports the values of contract parameters. A supply chain game model for bilateral preservation between manufacturers and retailers is designed to investigate the preservation cost sharing contracts in scenarios with and without bargaining. The enhancing effect of bargaining on bilateral preservation efforts, freshness of agricultural products and the total profit of a supply chain are analyzed by comparing the above two scenarios. Through the findings, the following conclusions are made. Bargaining can promote the sharing of preservation cost, and retailers share more of preservation cost than manufacturers; bargaining can promote bilateral preservation efforts and improve the freshness of agricultural products, where both manufacturers and retailers input more efforts; bargaining is beneficial for the operation of agricultural supply chains with higher system profits; freshness requirements of consumers strengthen the promotion of bargaining in bilateral preservation, the freshness of agricultural products and the operation of supply chains, but inhibit the promotion of bargaining on preservation cost sharing.

Key words: fresh agricultural supply chain, bilateral preservation, cost-sharing, bargaining