Abstract:  A study is conducted on the information freeriding behavior of the directsale channel on internet controlled by one manufacturer to the traditional retail channel controlled by one retailer in one dual-channel supply chain (DCSC). Assuming that the demand is random and dependent on retailer′s information service level, the centralized and decentralized decision models of DCSC are set up when both manufacturer and retailer are risk-averse by using the CVaR criterion and the equilibrium analysis method. One buy-back plus information service subsidy contract is put forward to coordinate this DCSC by using the contract theory. The numerical simulation demonstrates the reasonability of the proposed models and feasibility of the coordinative contracts. It shows that the introduction of direct-channel is a double-edged sword for DCSC, which can attract the potential demand, but the large-scale demand transfer from the retail channel to direct-sale channel should be avoided; the enhancement of information free-riding behavior of direct-sale channel benefits all agents of DCSC; the more risk-averse decision-makers are, the less order quantities are, which lowers the profits of manufacturer, retailer and the whole supply chain; the decisions of DCSC with risk-averse decision-makers are identical to those with risk-neutral members when the risk-averse factor equals to one.

Key words:  dual-channel supply chain, information free-riding behavior, conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) criterion, decision model, buy-back plus information service subsidy contract