A Study of the Recycling Mechanism of Waste Electronic Products Based on the Government Rewarding Towards Different Participants

Abstract

Abstract:

Three distributed decision-making Stackelberg models are established, including model of government rewarding the manufacturer, model of government rewarding the manufacturer and the consumer and model of government rewarding the manufacturer and the retailer, and finally an example is given testing the models. Results have shown that the premium mechanisms make an impact on the optimal profit of the manufacturer. It is more effective for the manufacturer to improve the collecting quantity of WEP in the mechanisms of rewarding the manufacturer than in the other models. Finally, the roposal is put forward that the government should regulate the recycling fee standards and determine the retailer’s recycle responsibility.

NI Ming1,2，3, LIANG Dan2, GUO Junhua2, YANG Shanlin3. A Study of the Recycling Mechanism of Waste Electronic Products Based on the Government Rewarding Towards Different Participants[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal .

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