The Effect of Knowledge Transfer Between Enterprises under Asymmetric Risk Attitude

Abstract

Abstract:

In order to optimize the effect of knowledge transfer between enterprises with risks of knowledge loss, the influences of both the information disclosure strategy of the knowledge sender and the information processing strategy of the knowledge accepter on knowledge transfer when the degrees of trust between both sides are different are analyzed, and the way of the government to optimize the effect of knowledge transfer between enterprises is found. The conclusions are illustrated by numerical simulations. The results show that the risk aversion party and the knowledge accepter will positively optimize the effect of knowledge transfer; that the higher the expected revenue of the risk aversion party than that of the risk preference party, the more easily the effect of knowledge transfer can be optimized; and that the government can improve the probability of optimizing the effect of knowledge transfer by formulating appropriate policies to adjust the compensation demanded by the knowledge sender and its monitoring cost.

Key words: knowledge transfer, risk attitude, information asymmetry, degree of trust

CHEN Guo, QI Ershi. The Effect of Knowledge Transfer Between Enterprises under Asymmetric Risk Attitude[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal .

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