A Cooperative Game Analysis of Supply Chain Based the Carbon Tax

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e17-4017

Abstract

Abstract: Adopting the thoughts of cooperative games, the two-echelon supply chain that includes the single manufacturer and the single retailer is studied by establishing the manufacturer's unilateral decision model and collaborative decision-making model between manufacturers and retailers to find the balance point that meets government requirements and ensures the collaborative profits. And the method of distributing Shapley value that is classic in cooperative game for supply chain is used to distribute collaborative profits reasonably. It is concluded that collaboration is far greater than the single decision whether from the effect of reducing carbon emissions or from the profits of the manufacturers and retailers. Finally, the feasibility of this model is shown by analyzing an example.

Key words: carbon tax, carbon emissions, Shapley value

CLC Number:

F205

SHAN Erfang, WANG Yan. A Cooperative Game Analysis of Supply Chain Based the Carbon Tax[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2017, 20(4): 87-93.

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