Abstract: The company + farmer supply chain is an important mode for improving operational efficiency of agricultural supply chains. However, there is a problem of distrust that farmers may not fully trust the market information provided by companies. A supply chain game model is developed to investigate the strategies for addressing farmer distrust in company information transmitting and farmer capacity planning decisions, and to analyze the impact of farmer distrust on operational decisions and farmer profits. Resutls are concluded as follows. Firstly, companies transmit market information strategically; farmer distrust prompts companies to not transmit accurate market information. Companies tend to transmit shrank information if they are more optimistic about market conditions than farmers, otherwise they transmit exaggerated information. Secondly, farmers adjust their productive capacity plans strategically. They increase the capacity if companies are more optimistic about market conditions than farmers, whereas they reduce the capacity. Thirdly, strategic information transmission by companies and strategic capacity adjustments by farmers can cope with the unfavorable effect of farmer distrust on both company profits and farmer capacity planning. However, farmer distrust inevitably leads to profit discrepancies, resulting in farmers consistently earning lower profits than expected.

Key words: company + farmer supply chains, farmer's distrust, strategic decisions