Coordination of Fresh Agricultural Supply Chain with Fairness Preference under Random Wastage

Abstract

Abstract:

The manufacturer′s fairness preference in the fresh agricultural supply chain is included in the research perspective. Based on the consideration of the effective supply and deterioration randomness of the fresh agricultural product, by constructing the Stackelberg game model, the influence of the manufacturer′s fairness preference in the operation of the fresh agricultural supply chain is analyzed and the coordination mechanism based on “risk-sharing & revenue-sharing” is designed. The research indicates that, in the decentralized decision-making, the different values of manufacturer′s fairness perception coefficient and unfairness aversion coefficient will exert different influences on the operation of fresh agricultural supply chain, and the sensitive degree of optimal decisions and profits of the fresh agricultural product supply chain to the fairness preference is different from the corresponding non-perishable product supply chain; when the contract parameter satisfies the certain conditions, the designed coordination mechanism can not only realize the perfect win-win and coordination of the fresh agricultural supply chain, but also eliminate the fairness preference of the manufacturer.

Key words: fresh agricultural product, fairness preference, random wastage, supply chain coordination

ZHANG Xu, ZHANG Qing. Coordination of Fresh Agricultural Supply Chain with Fairness Preference under Random Wastage[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal .

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