Abstract: Considering the dual behavioral preferences of supply chain members in the closed-loop supply chain game model under government rewards and punishment intervention, the influence of decision makers' behavioral preferences on the optimal decision-making and coordination of the closed-loop supply chain is discussed using the risk measurement criterion of mean standard deviation. The results show that the fairness concern of supply chain members is only a means of profits distribution within the closed-loop supply chain system. The fairness concern of retailer and recycler leads the manufacturer to give up part of their profits, thus contributing to the improvement of their own profits. The recycler's risk preference affects the transfer price and the recovery price. When supply chain members take utility maximization as their decision goal, the more risk the recycler likes, the more unfavorable it is to the manufacturer, and the more risk the recycler hates, the more unfavorable it is to the retailer. The effective coordination area is affected by the dual behavior preferences. The supply chain members' excessive concern for fairness, excessive risk preference or excessive risk aversion all make it difficult for the revenue sharing and cost sharing contract to realize supply chain coordination. Therefore, when the behavior preference of supply chain members is within a reasonable range acceptable to each member, the revenue sharing and cost sharing contract can realize Pareto improvement of closed-loop supply chain.

Key words: government intervention, closed-loop supply chain, dual behavioral preference, supply chain coordination