Abstract: The equity strategic alliance is a partnership formed between companies to achieve common goals. This is a very common phenomenon in supply chain management. In this context, a study is conducted on the influence of different market structures and shareholding ratios on competitive manufacturers' pricing strategies when supplier holds equity in the manufacturer. According to the difference in the market position of manufacturers, three stockholding models were constructed:duopoly leader, held-owner manufacturer as leader and un-held manufacturer as leader, using the backward induction of game theory to solve the equilibrium yield, retail price and optimal profit. The results show, 1)that the optimal retail price of manufacturer held by supplier is the highest when it is leader, and second when the competitor is leader. The optimal price of manufacturer not held by supplier is affected by both the shareholding ratio and the market structure; 2) that when the proportion of shareholding is large, the manufacturer held by supplier has the "first mover advantage" and the "backward advantage" when the proportion of shareholding is small, and the "backward advantage" of the manufacturer not held by supplier is irrelevant to the shareholding ratio; and 3) that the supply chain profit increases first and then decreases with the shareholding ratio, with social welfare positively correlated with the ratio.

Key words: vertical shareholding, supply chain, pricing strategy, market structure