Abstract: In order to analyze resource sharing behavior of multi-subject parallel construction of major projects under different mechanisms, the multi-agent parallel construction scenarios of major projects were divided into non-competitive engineering amount and competitive engineering amount. The Stackelberg dynamic game models with the resource demander as the leader and the resource provider as the follower in the two scenarios were constructed separately. And the resource sharing balance strategy and the optimal benefit were calculated and analyzed, and then the influence of factors such as owner's incentives, resource sharing efficiency, and cost coefficients on the equilibrium results were discussed. This study found that: under the equilibrium strategy, each construction entity can obtain additional benefits through resource sharing whether there is competition or not, and the benefits of resource recipients are greater than that of resource sharers; without competition mechanism, the owner's incentive intensity has a positive impact on the optimal resource sharing price, optimal resource sharing amount, and optimal resource sharing revenue; with competitive mechanism, the owner's incentive intensity has a positive effect on the optimal resource sharing amount, the optimal resource sharing revenue, but has a negative effect on the optimal resource sharing price.

Key words: mega project, resource sharing, competitive mechanism, parallel construction