随机产出下合作社型农产品供应链容纳能力与结构研究

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2018.06.011

工业工程 ›› 2018, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (6): 81-90.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2018.06.011

随机产出下合作社型农产品供应链容纳能力与结构研究

毛敏^1,2, 李启洋¹, 蔡忠娇¹

西南交通大学 1.交通运输与物流学院;
2. 综合交通大数据应用技术国家工程实验室, 四川成都 610031

收稿日期:2018-05-17 出版日期:2018-12-30 发布日期:2018-12-29
通讯作者: 李启洋(1994-)，男，福建省人，硕士研究生，主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理，Email：kejiaboy@163.com E-mail:kejiaboy@163.com
作者简介:毛敏(1975-)，女，四川省人，副教授，博士，硕士研究生导师，主要研究方向为物流系统规划与设计、供应链管理

A Study of Capacity and Structure of Agricultural Product Supply Chain with Cooperatives under Random Yield

MAO Min^1,2, LI Qiyang¹, CAI Zhongjiao¹

1. School of Transportation and Logistics;
2. National Engineering Laboratory of Integrated Transportation Big Data Application Technology, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China

Received:2018-05-17 Online:2018-12-30 Published:2018-12-29

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对我国农产品产销存在的因农户和合作社分散林立、混乱竞争而造成的农产品供应链成员利益受损等问题，建立了由企业主导的“农户+合作社+企业”型三级农产品供应链竞争博弈模型。在求解出水平Cournot数量竞争和纵向Stackelberg博弈均衡解的基础上，提出3种农户容量选择策略，并进一步探讨了下游成员参与博弈的竞争空间和供应链容纳能力。结果表明：合作社利润最优策略优于社会福利最优策略，供应链总利润最优策略在一定区间范围内优于合作社最优策略；下游成员参与博弈的竞争空间存在上界组合和下界组合，且上界组合是农产品供应链的均衡结构，也是供应链的最大容纳能力；合作社利润最优策略使企业有更大的竞争空间，社会福利最优策略使合作社具有更大的竞争空间。

关键词: 农产品供应链, 农户容量选择, 竞争空间, 均衡结构

Abstract: A three-stage agricultural product supply chain competition and game model including farmers and agricultural cooperatives is developed which is dominated by the enterprise. Three kinds of farmer capacity selection strategies are proposed based on the horizontal Cournot competition and vertical Stackelberg game equilibrium solution, and the competition space of the downstream members participating in the game and the capacity of the supply chain are discussed. The results show that the strategy of optimal cooperatives profit is superior to the strategy of optimal social welfare, and the strategy of optimal total profit of supply chain is better than the strategy of optimal cooperatives profit in a certain range. The competition space of the downstream members participating in the game has an upper bound and a lower bound. The structure of the agricultural supply chain comes to equilibrium and the supply chain comes to the largest capacity under the upper bound. The strategy of optimal cooperatives profit gives the enterprises more competition space and the optimal social welfare strategy gives the cooperatives more competition space.

Key words: agricultural product supply chain, farmers capacity selection, competition space, equilibrium structure

中图分类号:

F272

毛敏, 李启洋, 蔡忠娇. 随机产出下合作社型农产品供应链容纳能力与结构研究[J]. 工业工程, 2018, 21(6): 81-90.

MAO Min, LI Qiyang, CAI Zhongjiao. A Study of Capacity and Structure of Agricultural Product Supply Chain with Cooperatives under Random Yield[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2018, 21(6): 81-90.

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随机产出下合作社型农产品供应链容纳能力与结构研究

A Study of Capacity and Structure of Agricultural Product Supply Chain with Cooperatives under Random Yield

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