碳限额与碳交易下考虑时间偏好差异的供应链联合减排动态博弈

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2022.05.007

工业工程 ›› 2022, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (5): 55-64.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2022.05.007

碳限额与碳交易下考虑时间偏好差异的供应链联合减排动态博弈

秦立公, 张勇

桂林理工大学商学院，广西桂林 541004

收稿日期:2021-04-21 发布日期:2022-10-20
通讯作者: 张勇 (1997—)，男，江西省人，硕士研究生，主要研究方向为服务规划与策划、供应链与运营管理。Email: 2191734370@qq.com E-mail:2191734370@qq.com
作者简介:秦立公 (1962—)，男，广西壮族自治区人，教授，主要研究方向为服务规划与策划、供应链与运营管理
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目 (71463011, 71762008)

Dynamic Game of Supply Chain Joint Emission Reduction Considering Time Preference Difference under Carbon Quota and Carbon Trading

QIN Ligong, ZHANG Yong

Business School, Guilin University of Technology, Guilin 540014, China

Received:2021-04-21 Published:2022-10-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在碳限额与碳交易机制下，为探讨整个供应链联合动态减排问题，引入时间偏好效用函数并构建供应商、制造商、零售商三方微分博弈模型。利用逆向归纳法得出非协同分散决策与协同集中决策下的碳减排轨迹、供应链的整体价值。同时对决策时间偏好一致与决策时间偏好不一致的三方价值等进行数值仿真。结果表明，协同集中决策下碳减排量大于非协同分散决策下的碳减排量，协同集中决策更有利于实现碳减排的帕累托最优；在两种决策中，具有时间偏好一致的决策者所获得的价值往往更高；反之，决策者获得的价值会较少，且时间偏好不一致程度加剧了这一现象。

关键词: 碳限额与碳交易, 时间偏好差异, 供应链减排, 动态博弈

Abstract: Under the mechanism of carbon quota and carbon trading, in order to explore the joint dynamic emission reduction problem of the whole supply chain, the time preference utility function is introduced and a three-party differential game model of supplier, manufacturer and retailer is constructed. The trajectory of carbon emission reduction and the overall value of supply chain under non-collaborative decentralized decision-making and collaborative centralized decision-making are obtained by using the reverse induction method. At the same time, a numerical simulation is carried out on the tripartite value of consistent decision time preference and inconsistent decision time preference. The results show that the carbon emission reduction under collaborative centralized decision-making is greater than that under non-collaborative decentralized decision-making, and collaborative centralized decision-making is more conducive to achieving Pareto optimization of carbon emission reduction; in the two kinds of decision-making, the decision-maker with the same time preference often gets higher value; on the contrary, the decision-maker will get less value, and the inconsistent degree of time preference aggravates this phenomenon.

Key words: carbon quota and carbon trading, time preference difference, supply chain emission reduction, dynamic game

中图分类号:

F272.3

秦立公, 张勇. 碳限额与碳交易下考虑时间偏好差异的供应链联合减排动态博弈[J]. 工业工程, 2022, 25(5): 55-64.

QIN Ligong, ZHANG Yong. Dynamic Game of Supply Chain Joint Emission Reduction Considering Time Preference Difference under Carbon Quota and Carbon Trading[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2022, 25(5): 55-64.

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碳限额与碳交易下考虑时间偏好差异的供应链联合减排动态博弈

Dynamic Game of Supply Chain Joint Emission Reduction Considering Time Preference Difference under Carbon Quota and Carbon Trading

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