核心企业主导型供应链金融的序贯互惠博弈模型

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e16-3203

工业工程 ›› 2017, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (3): 106-112,124.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e16-3203

核心企业主导型供应链金融的序贯互惠博弈模型

陈金龙, 占永志, 邹小红

华侨大学工商管理学院, 福建泉州 362021

收稿日期:2016-07-08 出版日期:2017-06-30 发布日期:2017-07-12
作者简介:陈金龙(1965-),福建省人,教授,博士,博士生导师,主要研究方向为金融工程与金融管理
基金资助:
福建省社会科学规划项目（J2015B239）；国家自然科学基金资助项目（71571074）

A Sequential Reciprocity Game Model of Supply Chain Finance Led by Core Enterprise

CHEN Jinlong, ZHAN Yongzhi, ZOU Xiaohong

College of Business Administration, Huaqiao University, Quanzhou 362021, China

Received:2016-07-08 Online:2017-06-30 Published:2017-07-12

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 以DK序贯互惠博弈模型为基础，在一般化假设基础上，构建了核心企业提供供应链金融支持的供应商与核心企业合作行为的两阶段序贯互惠模型。推导得出了在供应商完全理性假设条件下和具有互惠动机条件下供应商与核心企业博弈行为的序贯互惠均衡（sequential reciprocity equilibrium，SRE），并在此基础上提出命题1、2、3，分别指出供应商具有完全理性、供应商具有互惠动机但核心企业不提供支持与核心企业提供支持三种情形下的合作行为。最后，算例验证了论文所得结论。该研究结论将对供应链金融合作关系决策提供积极的参考价值。

关键词: 供应链金融, 互惠合作, 序贯互惠博弈

Abstract: Based on the DK sequential reciprocity game model,with the general hypothesis,a two-stage sequential reciprocity model of cooperative behavior between the supplier and the core enterprise with the core enterprise's support for the supplier is constructed.The sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE) of the game between the supplier and the core enterprise is also derived from the model under the assumption that the supplier is completely rational and the supplier has reciprocity motivation,and on this basis,the conclusions 1,2,3 are proposed to point out respectively the cooperation behaviors between the supplier and the core enterprise under three conditions which are 1) the supplier has complete rationality;2) the supplier has reciprocity motivation but the core enterprise does not provide support;3) the supplier has reciprocity motivation and the core enterprise provides support.Finally,an example is given to verify the conclusions.The conclusions of the study will provide a positive reference for supply chain finance cooperation decision.

Key words: supply chain financing, reciprocal cooperation, sequential reciprocity game

中图分类号:

F830

陈金龙, 占永志, 邹小红. 核心企业主导型供应链金融的序贯互惠博弈模型[J]. 工业工程, 2017, 20(3): 106-112,124.

CHEN Jinlong, ZHAN Yongzhi, ZOU Xiaohong. A Sequential Reciprocity Game Model of Supply Chain Finance Led by Core Enterprise[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2017, 20(3): 106-112,124.

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核心企业主导型供应链金融的序贯互惠博弈模型

A Sequential Reciprocity Game Model of Supply Chain Finance Led by Core Enterprise

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