考虑未来成本的医疗寻租行为监管演化博弈分析

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e16-3245

工业工程 ›› 2017, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (3): 89-94,105.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e16-3245

考虑未来成本的医疗寻租行为监管演化博弈分析

陈海荣¹, 李小莉², 谢天³, 李从东^1,2

1. 天津大学管理与经济学部, 天津 300072;
2. 暨南大学管理学院, 广东广州 510632;
3. 南华大学经济管理学院, 湖南衡阳 421000

收稿日期:2016-09-09 出版日期:2017-06-30 发布日期:2017-07-12
作者简介:陈海荣(1971-),男,广东省人,博士研究生,主要研究方向为药事管理
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71672074，71501087）；教育部人文社科项目（14YJCZH168）；湖南省自然科学基金资助项目（2015JJ3107）

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Regulation of Medical Rent-Seeking Behavior Considering Future Cost

CHEN Hairong¹, LI Xiaoli², XIE Tian³, LI Congdong^1,2

1. College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China;
2. School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China;
3. School of Economics and Management, University of South China, Hengyang 421001, China

Received:2016-09-09 Online:2017-06-30 Published:2017-07-12

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了分析未来成本对医生与政府监管部门行为演化的影响，本文基于演化博弈理论，构建了考虑未来成本的政府监管部门与医生之间的演化博弈模型。研究发现，在不考虑未来成本的情形下，当政府监管部门的监管收益小于监管成本，且对医生寻租行为的惩罚不足时，系统最终可能演化为医生选择寻租策略的稳定状态；在考虑未来成本的情形下，当医生寻租的未来成本转化为预期损失的系数达到一定水平时，可以在一定程度上遏制医生的寻租行为。因此，政府在制定相应监管与惩罚机制的基础上，还应加强医生流动市场、声誉档案及营业执照的管理，约束医生的行为，保护患者利益。

关键词: 寻租, 演化博弈, 政府监管, 未来成本

Abstract: In order to analyze the influence of future cost on the behaviors of doctor and supervision department,an evolutionary game model between the government supervision department and the doctor is constructed considering future cost.Research shows that,in the case of not considering future cost and the supervision strategy not being chosen because the supervision cost of government supervision department is greater than the supervision benefit,it may eventually evolve into the stable state of the doctor choosing rent-seeking because of insufficient punishment.When the future cost is considered and its transformation reaches a certain level,it can restrict doctor's rent-seeking behavior to a certain extent.Therefore,on the basis of establishing appropriate regulation and penalty mechanisms,the government should also strengthen the management of the mobile market,reputation files and license of doctors to restrain doctors' behavior and protect the interests of patients.

Key words: rent-seeking, evolutionary game, government regulation, future cost

中图分类号:

F124

陈海荣, 李小莉, 谢天, 李从东. 考虑未来成本的医疗寻租行为监管演化博弈分析[J]. 工业工程, 2017, 20(3): 89-94,105.

CHEN Hairong, LI Xiaoli, XIE Tian, LI Congdong. An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Regulation of Medical Rent-Seeking Behavior Considering Future Cost[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2017, 20(3): 89-94,105.

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考虑未来成本的医疗寻租行为监管演化博弈分析

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Regulation of Medical Rent-Seeking Behavior Considering Future Cost

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