工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2011, Vol. 14 ›› Issue (5): 19-23.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

经济政策对制造商回收的闭环供应链影响分析

  

  1. 1.江南大学 商学院,江苏 无锡 214122; 2.山东理工大学 商学院,山东 淄博 255049
  • 出版日期:2011-10-31 发布日期:2011-11-11
  • 作者简介:王雷(1979-),安徽省人,副教授,博士,主要研究方向为契约理论与公司金融.
  • 基金资助:

    山东省软科学研究计划资助项目(2009RKA173);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目（10YJC630241）；江苏省社会科学研究青年基金项目（10GLC012）

On the Effect of Economic Policies on ClosedLoop Supply Chain with Manufacturer Collection

  1. 1.School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi 214122, China; 2.Business School, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255049, China
  • Online:2011-10-31 Published:2011-11-11

摘要： 为研究经济政策对闭环供应链的影响，以博弈论为基本工具，建立了经济政策调节下的集中决策闭环供应链模型和制造商回收的闭环供应链模型；导出了回收率、销售价及供应链利润与惩罚因子之间的函数关系；通过灵敏度分析，发现了集中决策闭环供应链中经济激励作用有一个度的问题，即惩罚因子存在一个阈值；设计了收益共享契约，实现了制造商回收再制造闭环供应链的协调和优化。通过数值分析，验证了回收率、销售价及供应链利润与惩罚因子之间的趋势关系，找到了惩罚因子的阈值和收益共享契约。

关键词: 经济政策, 闭环供应链, 灵敏度分析, 收益共享契约

Abstract: A closed-loop supply chain with the manufacturer collecting its endoflife products is considered. The issue discussed in this paper is how the economic incentive policies impact the performance of the supply chain. A game theory model is developed for such a supply chain under the centralized decision making mode. With this model, with the penalty factor as variable, analytical expressions are obtained to calculate the recycling rate, sale price, and the supply chain profit. Then, by sensitivity analysis, it is found that, for economic incentive of product recycling, there is a threshold in regulating the penalty factor. Based on the results obtained, revenuesharing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain such that the profit is maximized. A numerical example is used to verify the results presented in this paper. 

Key words: economic incentive policies, closedloop supply chain, sensitivity analysis, revenuesharing contract