工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2014, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (5): 114-117.

• 实践与应用 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于NASH协商的促销努力成本分担机制

  

  1. （东南大学 经济管理学院， 江苏 南京 211189）
  • 出版日期:2014-10-31 发布日期:2014-12-01
  • 作者简介:马小勇（1979-），男，江苏省人，博士，主要研究方向为供应链协调与成本分配.
  • 基金资助:

     国家自然科学基金资助项目（71272111）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助（3214003901）

A Research on the Mechanism of Sharing Sales Effort Cost  Based on Nash Negotiation

  1. （School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189,China）
  • Online:2014-10-31 Published:2014-12-01

摘要：  传统的回购契约、数量折扣契约和利润共享契约等可以解决销售商订购量与实际需求不匹配问题，但会产生新的激励约束而失效。合作促销契约的引入，并与其他协调机制的结合可以有效改善供应链协调的最优化水平。以成本分担为对象，采用不对称Nash协商模型，来设计伴随销售商促销努力的供应链协调契约，弥补了剩余收益数据难以获得与忽略谈判能力因素造成最优报酬契约设计的缺陷。

关键词: 促销努力成本, 供应链协调, 分担比例, Nash协商

Abstract:  The traditional buy-back contract, quantity discount contract and profit sharing contract can solve the problem of mismatch between vendors ordering quantity and the actual demand, but they produce new incentive failure. Introduction of the cooperation promotion, combined with other coordination mechanism, can effectively improve the level of optimization of supply chain coordination. With the cost sharing as the object, adopting the asymmetric Nash negotiation model with retailer promotional effort, a supply chain coordination contract is designed, thus making up the residual income data which are difficult to obtain and ignore the negotiation ability factors causing defects in optimal reward contract design.

Key words:  promotional cost, supply chain coordination, sharing proportion, Nash negotiation