基于政府、企业和消费者三方博弈的电动汽车市场推广分析

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对电动汽车市场推广乏力的问题，采用完美信息动态博弈的方法，构建了一个基于政府、企业和消费者三方博弈的电动汽车市场推广模型。通过对均衡解进行分析，指出以降低电动汽车隐性成本为目标的稳健管制策略能更好地促进电动汽车的市场推广，建议出台加大政府扶持力度和提高基础设施投入的组合政策，并尽快建立健全燃油汽车污染处罚机制。

关键词: 三方博弈, 纳什均衡, 电动汽车, 政府管制

Abstract: To improve the poor performance of electric vehicle market, a trilateral game model involving government, enterprises and consumers is established based on dynamic game with perfect information. Analyses on the equilibrium solution indicate that better performance in electric vehicle marketing can be achieved by robust stratagem, which aims at reducing the hidden cost in electric vehicle producing and consuming phases. To enhance the market performance effectively, it is suggested to introduce a policy mix, which guarantees an incremental government support with higher quota of investment on infrastructures, and to establish the penalty mechanism against petrol vehicle pollution as soon as possible.

Key words: trilateral game, Nash equilibrium, electric vehicle, government regulation

秦字兴，朱阁. 基于政府、企业和消费者三方博弈的电动汽车市场推广分析[J]. 工业工程, 2015, 18(4): 1-08.

Qin Zi-xing, Zhu Ge. A Marketing Analysis of Electric Vehicles Based on Trilateral Game among Government, Enterprises and Consumers[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2015, 18(4): 1-08.

参考文献

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