工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2021, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (1): 35-43.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2021.01.005

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

政府干预下考虑双重行为偏好特征的闭环供应链决策与协调

尚春燕1,2, 关志民1, 米力阳3   

  1. 1. 东北大学 工商管理学院，辽宁 沈阳 110169;
    2. 宁夏理工学院 经济管理学院;
    3. 理学与化学工程学院，宁夏 石嘴山 753000
  • 收稿日期:2020-07-15 发布日期:2021-02-24
  • 作者简介:尚春燕(1980-)，女，黑龙江省人，讲师，博士研究生，主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972100，71372186)

Decision-making and Coordination of Closed-loop Supply Chain Considering Dual Behavior Preference under Government Intervention

SHANG Chunyan1,2, GUAN Zhimin1, MI Liyang3   

  1. 1. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management;
    3. School of Science and Chemical Engineering, Ningxia Institute of Science and Technology, Shizuishan 753000, China
  • Received:2020-07-15 Published:2021-02-24

RichHTML

7

PDF

5200

摘要： 将供应链成员双重行为偏好特征考虑到政府奖惩干预下的闭环供应链决策模型中，采用均值-标准差风险度量准则探讨了决策者行为偏好对闭环供应链最优决策和协调性的影响。结论表明：公平关切行为只是闭环供应链系统内部利润分配的一种手段，零售商和回收商公平关切行为会促使制造商出让部分利润，从而有利于自身利润的提高；回收商风险偏好行为影响回收转移价和回收价，当供应链成员以效用最大化为决策目标时，回收商越喜好风险，对制造商越不利，越厌恶风险，对零售商越不利；有效协调区域受到双重行为偏好特征的影响，供应链成员过度公平关切以及过度喜好风险或过度规避风险都将使收益共享-费用分担契约难以实现供应链协调，当供应链成员的行为偏好在各成员可接受的合理范围内，收益共享-费用分担契约能够实现闭环供应链Pareto改善。

关键词: 政府干预, 闭环供应链, 双重行为偏好, 供应链协调

Abstract: Considering the dual behavioral preferences of supply chain members in the closed-loop supply chain game model under government rewards and punishment intervention, the influence of decision makers' behavioral preferences on the optimal decision-making and coordination of the closed-loop supply chain is discussed using the risk measurement criterion of mean standard deviation. The results show that the fairness concern of supply chain members is only a means of profits distribution within the closed-loop supply chain system. The fairness concern of retailer and recycler leads the manufacturer to give up part of their profits, thus contributing to the improvement of their own profits. The recycler's risk preference affects the transfer price and the recovery price. When supply chain members take utility maximization as their decision goal, the more risk the recycler likes, the more unfavorable it is to the manufacturer, and the more risk the recycler hates, the more unfavorable it is to the retailer. The effective coordination area is affected by the dual behavior preferences. The supply chain members' excessive concern for fairness, excessive risk preference or excessive risk aversion all make it difficult for the revenue sharing and cost sharing contract to realize supply chain coordination. Therefore, when the behavior preference of supply chain members is within a reasonable range acceptable to each member, the revenue sharing and cost sharing contract can realize Pareto improvement of closed-loop supply chain.

Key words: government intervention, closed-loop supply chain, dual behavioral preference, supply chain coordination

中图分类号: