Abstract: Opaque sales is a popular strategy for selling leftover capacity in airline ticket sales and is in rapid development in recent years. The Hotelling model is used to establish two models, one in traditional opaque sales channel, the other in direct channel and opaque sales channel existing at the same time. Then, the equilibrium prices and benefits of airlines and intermediary in the two sales modes of supply and demand are solved, which is to find out when the airline is most profitable. It is found that opaque sales exists when the market is competitive, and at the end of the season, the total expected revenue of the airlines under the environment of competition is higher than the traditional opaque sales. At the same time, the intermediary is motivated to implement this strategy, which highlights the guiding role of dual channel simultaneous sales to market demand. Theoretical references can be provided for the pricing in competitive and channel selection of airlines.

Key words: opaque sales, passenger strategic behavior, duopoly competition, revenue management