Abstract: In order to better explore the distribution of product customization rights between manufacturers and retailers, a game model for the distribution of product customization rights of supply chain enterprises under the leadership of manufacturers is proposed. By the model, based on the theory of Kano demand analysis, product customization module types are divided into three categories according to the consumer demand, and through the combination of the three types of customized modules present four product customization schemes, dominated by the manufacturers through the use of Stackelberg game model. A model of product customization between manufacturers and retailers permissions distribution is built, analyzing the two cases of custom permissions homogeneity and differentiation of manufacturers and retailers decision. Using example application and solving the model, the optimal solution is derived from the custom permissions distribution of the manufacturer-led manufacturers and retailers. The results show that only when the product customization range of the manufacturer and the retailer is completely differentiated can the manufacturer and the retailer achieve the equilibrium solution of the product customization authority and maximize the profit of the supply chain.

Key words: game, product customization authority, supply chain, manufacturer's leadership