Abstract: For a quantitative research on the vulnerability of supply chain under the disturbance of production cost and different power structures, two supply chain game models of centralized decision-making, manufacturer-led and retailer-led online and offline dual-channel supply chain and direct channel supply chain were constructed. The length of the manufacturer’s production cost disturbance interval which keeps the optimal decision of supply chain unchanged was used to measure the vulnerability of supply chain and the larger the interval length was, the smaller the vulnerability of supply chain was. The results show that: 1) for online and offline dual-channel supply chain, the length of the cost disturbance interval is equal to that of the centralized decision-making and is manufacturer-dominated, that is, they have the same vulnerability but it is greater than the retailer-dominated vulnerability; 2) for the direct supply chain, the length of the manufacturer-dominated cost disturbance interval is greater than the centralized decision, that is, the manufacturer-dominated supply chain vulnerability is less than in the centralized decision, while the size of retailer-dominated supply chain vulnerability is related to the parameters β and k. Finally, the feasibility of the proposed method is verified by numerical simulations.

Key words: supply chain, vulnerability, game theory, power structure, cost disturbance