Abstract: In order to discuss the cooperation between the manufacturer and the reselling platform and the agency selling platform, a Stackelberg game model led by the manufacturer is applied to analyze the decision-making of the supply chain when the retailer has horizontal fairness concern, vertical fairness concern and bidirectional fairness concerns. An example is given to compare the effects of different fairness concerns on pricing strategies and profits of supply chain members, and the platform selection strategies of the manufacturer are further discussed. The research shows that the tendency of retailers to be concerned about fairness is not always conducive to improving their own profits. From the perspective of absolute profit, the greater the horizontal fairness concern is, the more favorable it is for the manufacturer to cooperate with reselling platform. The greater the vertical fairness concern is, the better for the manufacturer working with agency selling platform. From the perspective of relative profit, the manufacturer tends to cooperate with reselling platform under high horizontal fairness concern and low vertical fairness concern while the manufacturer tends to partner with agency selling platform under low horizontal fairness concern and high vertical fairness concern.

Key words: fairness concern, dual-channel closed-loop supply chain, reselling, agency selling