Abstract: In a dual-channel supply chain composed of manufacturers and platform retailers, considering the asymmetric cross-channel influence of quality information disclosure between manufacturers and platform retailers, a disclosure strategy with manufacturer dominance and a game model of channel pricing are established. The pricing behavior of manufacturers and platform retailers is studied with the non-disclosure strategy, the disclosure strategy with manufacturer dominance and the disclosure strategy with retailer dominance. The quality disclosure thresholds for manufacturers and retailers are determined through comparison, while the impact of product quality levels and the cross-channel influence of platform retailer disclosure on the game equilibrium is analyzed. Results show that: 1) a high quality level induces manufacturers to proactively disclose quality information, while a low quality level makes manufacturers more inclined to retailer disclosure; 2) the disclosure willingness of platform retailers increases with the improvement of their cross-channel influence; 3) when the quality level is high and retailers have significant cross-channel influence, both manufacturers and retailers prefer retailer disclosure; 4) high cross-channel influence of disclosure is not always beneficial to platform retailers: when the cross-channel influence of retailers exceeds a certain threshold, the profit of retailers decreases significantly due to the change of disclosure strategy first, and then increases as retailer influence grows.

Key words: dual-channel, quality information disclosure, free-rider effect, cost sharing, Stackelberg game