Stackelberg Game Model for Two-Level Supply Chain with Allocation  Mechanism of Carbon Emission Permit

Abstract

Abstract: The supply chain multi-stage carbon footprint is measured from the two aspects: conversion and logistics links. Then, by taking the manufacturer as the core business of the supply chain, Stackelberg game decision-making model of carbon sensitive supply chain is established under free allocation mechanism, the threshold allocation mechanism, and full market trading mechanism of carbon emission permit, respectively. Then the impact of the three mechanisms on supply chain balanced decisions is analyzed. The results show that different carbon emission permit allocation trading mechanisms affect the total receipts of the supply chain. It also shows that when the mechanism changes from free allocation mechanism to full market trading mechanism, carbon reduction rate in the manufacturing link and the incentive of supply chain carbon reduction gradually reduces. 

Key words: supply chain, carbon emission permit, carbon reduction, Stackelberg game

Fu Qiufang, Xin Liyan, Ma Jianying. Stackelberg Game Model for Two-Level Supply Chain with Allocation Mechanism of Carbon Emission Permit[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2013, 16(2): 41-47.

References

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Stackelberg Game Model for Two-Level Supply Chain with Allocation Mechanism of Carbon Emission Permit

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