Industrial Engineering Journal ›› 2017, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (3): 106-112,124.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e16-3203

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A Sequential Reciprocity Game Model of Supply Chain Finance Led by Core Enterprise

CHEN Jinlong, ZHAN Yongzhi, ZOU Xiaohong   

  1. College of Business Administration, Huaqiao University, Quanzhou 362021, China
  • Received:2016-07-08 Online:2017-06-30 Published:2017-07-12

Abstract: Based on the DK sequential reciprocity game model,with the general hypothesis,a two-stage sequential reciprocity model of cooperative behavior between the supplier and the core enterprise with the core enterprise's support for the supplier is constructed.The sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE) of the game between the supplier and the core enterprise is also derived from the model under the assumption that the supplier is completely rational and the supplier has reciprocity motivation,and on this basis,the conclusions 1,2,3 are proposed to point out respectively the cooperation behaviors between the supplier and the core enterprise under three conditions which are 1) the supplier has complete rationality;2) the supplier has reciprocity motivation but the core enterprise does not provide support;3) the supplier has reciprocity motivation and the core enterprise provides support.Finally,an example is given to verify the conclusions.The conclusions of the study will provide a positive reference for supply chain finance cooperation decision.

Key words: supply chain financing, reciprocal cooperation, sequential reciprocity game

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