Abstract: The determination of the product green degree and pricing of green supply chain in which the manufacturer and retailer are taking risk aversion is focused on. First of all, with a two-stage green supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer as the background, consumer preferences, product green degree, degree of risk aversion and other factors are considered, and their expected utility functions are built. Then this problem is solved by game theory under two different scenarios:centralized and decentralized. In the centralized scenario, a model is adopted in which players of the green supply are integrated. In the decentralized scenario, a Stackelberg game model with the manufacturer as leader and the retailer as follower, a Stackelberg game model with the retailer as leader and the manufacturer as follower and a Nash Equilibrium game are established. Then a comparative analysis is conducted in terms of wholesale price, product green degree and retail price. On this basis, further comparative analysis is conducted when the manufacturer and retailer take different risk attitudes. Finally, a numerical simulation is given by MATLAB software in order to validate the centralized decision model. The simulation results show that under certain market conditions, the risk aversion of the manufacturer has greater influence on wholesale prices than the retailer, and the impacts on product green degree, retail prices, and supply chain utility are the same and negatively correlated; when the degree of risk aversion of the manufacturer and retailer is 0.5, the optimal product green degree is between 3.3 and 3.4, and the maximum product green degree is 7.8.

Key words: risk aversion, green supply chain, product green degree, game theory